In this work we have investigated how quantum resources can improve the security of protocol for authentication of classical messages, introduced by Brassard in 1983. In that protocol, the shared key is the seed of a pseudo-random generator (PRG) and a hash function is used to create the authentication tag of a public message. We have started by showing that a BB84-type encoding of secret bits offers more security than the classical XOR function introduced by Brassard. Furthermore, we established the conditions a general PRG must satisfy for our quantum-enhanced protocol to yield informationtheoretical security. Altogether, our proposal represents a twofold improvement: first it offers proven information-theoretical security under some assumptions on the PRG; secondly, these assumptions are weaker than the requirements for the PRG in Brassard's protocol. Additionally, our proposal is also more practical in the sense that it requires a shorter key than the classical scheme by using the pseudorandom bits to choose the tag's hash function.
Introduction
The authentication of public messages is a fundamental problem nowadays for bipartite and network communications. The scenario is the following: Alice sends a (classical) message to Bob through a public channel, together with an authentication tag through a private or public channel. The tag will allow Bob to verify if the message he received via the public channel has been tampered with or if it is indeed the authentic message, originally sent by Alice. A third character, Eve, wants to sabotage this scheme by intercepting Alice's message and sending her own message to Bob, together with a false tag which will convince Bob he is receiving the authentic message. For instance, one could imagine that Alice is sending to Bob her bank account number, to which Bob will transfer some money, and Eve wants to interfere in the communication in such a way that Bob will receive her bank account number believing it is Alice's one, thus giving his money to Eve.
In 1983, G. Brassard proposed a computationally secure scheme of classical authentication tags based on the sharing of short secret keys [1] . In this work, we extend Brassard's protocol to include quantum authentication tags, which we prove will offer, under certain conditions, information-theoretical security for the authentication of classical messages. Brassard's scheme is itself an improvement of the Wegman-Carter protocol [2] . Brassard showed that a relatively short seed of a PRG can be used as a secret key shared between Alice and Bob which will allow the exchange of computationally secure authentication tags. This method yields a much more practical protocol, where the requirements on the seed length grow reasonably with the number of messages we want to authenticate, as opposed to the Wegman-Carter proposal.
Preliminaries
In this section we set up basic notation, briefly review the description of the Brassard's protocol and describe our new proposal. We conclude the section with a negative result on the robustness of a attackble PRG when its output is hidden by a specific quantum encoding. As hash functions are an important ingredient for all protocols described here we start by presenting their formal definition [6] : Definition 2.1 (ǫ − almost strongly universal-2 hash functions) Let M and T be finite sets and call functions from M to T hash functions. Let ǫ be a positive real number. A set H of hash functions is ǫ−almost strongly universal-2 if the following two conditions are satisfied 1) The number of hash functions in H that takes an arbitrary m ∈ M to an arbitrary t ∈ T is exactly |H|/|T |.
2) The fraction of those functions that also takes m ′ = m in M to an arbitrary t ′ ∈ T (possibly equal to t) is no more than ǫ.
Figure 1: Brassard's classical authentication protocol [1] For additional details on universal-2 functions we refer [2] . Brassard's protocol (see Figure 1 ) make use of two secret keys. The first one, Y (l) , specifies a fixed universal-2 hash function h ∈ H, where l = ⌈log |H|⌉. The second specifies the seed X (n) ∈ Z n 2 , for a PRG, a sequence of n bits. We denote M the set of messages and T the set of tags, where log |M| >> log |T |. The main ingredient of our first quantum-enhanced protocol proposed (see Figure 2 ) is replacing the classical gate XOR of Brassard protocol by a quantum encoder similar to that utilized with the BB84 protocol [11] . After some developments we shall verify that the key Y (l) is no longer necessary. Assume that Alice and Bob agree on two orthonormal bases B 0 and B 1 for the 2-dimensional Hilbert space,
These bases will be used to prepare four quantum states, as in BB84 protocol. We shall refer to this process of preparation as quantum encoding. For each bit of the k = ⌈log |T |⌉ bits long tag t m = h(m), Alice prepares a quantum state |ψ = |ψ (X i , t m i ) based on the corresponding bit X i from the PRG and m i of t m . Then, if the bit X i = 0, Alice prepares |ψ using B 0 basis, such that
Similarly, if the bit X i = 1, Alice prepares |ψ using B 1 basis, such that
After the qubits generation, Alice sends the non-entagled state |ψ m ⊗k to Bob through a noiseless quantum channel and the message m through an unauthentic classical channel. At the reception, Bob makes measurements to obtain a sequence of k bits from the quantum encoded version of h(m). For the i-th received qubit, Bob measures it using the basis B 0 or B 1 depending on the i−th bit of X is 0 or 1, respectively, recovering a k bits long string t ′ = h ′ |ψ ⊗k . Because the quantum channel is assumed to be perfect, Bob recognizes that the message is authentic if h ′ = h(m B ), where m B is the message received from the classical channel. Otherwise, Bob assumes that Eve tried to send him an unauthentic message. He then discards the received message. Throughout this article it is always assumed that the above coding rule is public. Next we focus on the crucial aspects of the PRGs. 
Weak pseudo-random generators
Clearly, it is important to understand how secure the authentication code described above is.
As we shall see, the security of the authentication code is deeply related with to quality of the pseudo-random generator. As a matter of fact, if the pseudo-random generator can be attacked by a quantum computer so does the authentication code. To set this result we refer to Figure 3 , that describes a simple scheme to assist us the proof. In this scheme we simply allow Eve to compare a sequence {Y i } of classical bits with the corresponding sequence {Z i } obtained from the measurement apparatus M. The variable Z(Y, θ) emphasizes that Eve can use her knownledge on Y in order to optmize a parameter θ of M.
Recall that a pseudo-random generator is a polynomial-time family of functions G = {G n : Z n 2 × N → Z 2 } n∈N where Z 2 is the set {0, 1} and G n is the pseudo-generator for seeds with size n, that is, G n (X (n) , i) returns the i-th bit generated from n bits long seed X (n) . Pseudo-random generator are expected to fulfill a indistinguishability property that we will not detail here for the sake of simplicity (the interested reader can look at [7] ). In the following definition we write
to denote a subsequence of p(n) (not necessarily contiguous) bits generated by G.
Definition 2.2
We say that a pseudo-random generator G is attackable in (quantum/probabilistic) polynomial time if there exists a (quantum/probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm P and polynomial p such that if P is fed with a subsequence of p(n) (not necessarily contiguous) generated bits X p(n) of G we have that:
For a pseudo-random generator to be attackable, there must exist an algorithm (quantum or probabilistic) that receives a subsequence of p(n) generated bits (not necessarily contiguous) and is able to compute the seed up to a negligible uncertainty. We observe that the security/randomness of the pseudo-random generator can not be grounded in the fact that the attack can only be performed to a contiguous subsequence of generated bits. This is due to the fact that the generator could always hide some bits if the attack required this type of sequences. A simple example of a pseudo-random generator that can be attackable in polynomial time are the pseudo-number generators based on linear congruence [8] . Figure 3 is not secure in polynomial-time for a quantum adversary that has access to Y = {Y i }.
Proof. Since G is attackable there exists a quantum polynomial time algorithm P and a polynomial p such that if P is fed with p(n) bits of the string X generated by G then P computes (up to negligible uncertainty) the seed X (n) of G. So it is enough to show that Eve, upon capturing the qubits generated by QC is able to recover (with non negligible probability) p(n) bits of X.
Indeed, assume that Eve has captured 8p(n) qubits |ψ i , i : 1 . . . 8p(n) and has measure them in a random basis (that is either the computational or the diagonal basis). Eve can now verify if Z i = Y i . If this occur Eve does not now if the basis chose to encode the Y i bit was the basis she measured or if she got with 1 2 probability the correct bit due to encoding in the other basis. However, if the outcome is different (that is the Y i = Z i ), then she knows that the basis at the i − th bit is the basis she did not choose the measure, because no mismatch would be possible if the encoding was performed with the same basis. In the latter case she knows that the X i either 0 or 1 depending if she measure with the diagonal or the computational basis, respectively. Moreover, this happens with 1/4 probability. So the probability of Eve not obtaining p(n) elements of X by measuring 8p(n) qubits is given by the cumulative function of a binomial distribution with 1/4 Bernoulli trial, 8p(n) trials and success of at most p(n). By Hoeffding's inequality this probability is upper-bounded by exp −2
) = exp(−2p(n)) which decreases exponentially with n, and so in other words, Eve has an exponentially increasing probability of obtaining p(n) bits of X with 8p(n) qubits measurements. Since G is attackable by knowing p(n) bits of X, Eve is able to perform this attack up to negligible probability. Figure 2 is not secure in polynomial-time for a quantum adversary that has access to hash function h.
Corollary 1 If a pseudo-random generator G is attackable then the scheme presented in
Proof. Eve is able to calculate h(m) from m that is public. Therefore she can apply Theorem 2.3 by observing a number N of tags such that N log |T | ≥ 8p(n).
Although Theorem 2.3 points that the quantum encoding of Figure 3 is not better asymptotically than the classical encoding ( where we simply replace the quantum coder QC by a XOR gate), it seems harder to attack the quantum scheme. We will now show that this is true for the simple case where the encoder is fed by an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli sequence.
3
Comparing XOR with BB84 encoding
To make a rigorous comparison between the XOR and the quantum (B884-like) encoding we will compare their minimum entropy in a very particular way. To this end, we consider the schemes presented in Figure 4 , where: X and Y are fair and independent Bernoulli random variables; QC is the quantum encoder defined before, with X being the variable chosen to set the basis; M (Y, θ) is the projective measurement defined by the Hermitian operator:
. Variable Z in the XOR coding is such that Z = X ⊕ Y ; the variable Z θ(Y ) in the quantum encoding corresponds to outcome of the measurement M (Y, θ) applied to the quantum state |ψ that is the output of the encoder of Y according to the basis determined by X, as described in Equations (1) and (2) .
For the classical case (Figure 4, left) we have
For the quantum case (Figure 4 , right) we denote θ Y in order to stress that the choice of θ depends on Y. Actually if Y = 0, the measurement M (Y, θ) aims to discriminate qubits in the set Q 0 = {|0 , |+ }, otherwise, if Y = 1, the measurement aims to discriminate qubits in the set Q 1 = {|1 and |− }. Using Figure 5 , we note also that the calculation can be done using only one paramenter, that is θ = θ 0 = θ 1 (with θ 1 taken anticlockwise from the vertical axis). With these remarks in mind, a straighforward calculation reads
Minimizing H (X|Y, Z(Y, θ)) in θ we obtain respectively for the entropy and for the angle the values ≈ 0.600 and − π 8 . We notice that H (X|Y, Z(Y, θ)) = S(Q 0 ) = S(Q 1 ) where S(Q Y ) stands for the von Neumann entropy of quantum system Q Y , described by the density matrix
where |φ 1 , |φ 2 are respectively |φ 1 = |0 and |φ 2 = |+ for Y = 0 or |φ 1 = |1 and |φ 2 = |− for Y = 1. This is not a coincidence. In fact, recall the general statement [4] : Let ρ = x p x ρ x , where p x = Pr[X = x] and ρ x are density operators, then
where and p X stands for the probability distribution of the "index" random variable X. It is clear that if ρ x are pure states, then S(ρ x ) = 0, reducing the inequality to H (p X ) ≥ S(ρ). 
Generalization to unfair input blocks
The results above where obtained assuming that both sequences {X i } and {Y i } were i.i.d. fair Bernoulli random variables. In this section we study the general case, aiming to clarify how the use of a real PRG affects the uncertainty about X. We begin with the single qubit case. First of all, observe that a biased {Y i } does not alter the optimum θ in the scheme of Figure 5 . Indeed H (X|Y, Z(Y, θ)) is derived only from the uncertainty on the quantum subsystem Q Y whose value is the same either Y = 0 or Y = 1.
Concerning the unfairness of {X i }, the best strategy for Eve to guess the bit X i is to prepare a measurement (POVM) over the i−th qubit given that she knowns all Y 1 , . . . , Y i binary digits and she has extracted as much information as possible from the previous (i − 1) qubits ⊗ 
, be the best estimative of the probability Pr [X i = 0] Eve is able to get from the measures she made. Note that, in the case of a PRG, p i will capture the dependencies between the X i 's generated by PRG under the Eve's point of view. Clearly the subsystem she owns is described by
Teh corresponding lower bound is
where H b (α) = α log α + (1 − α) log(1 − α) stands for the binary entropy of α ∈ (0, 1) and λ = 1 2 1 ± 1 − 2p i (1 − p i ) are the eigenvalues of the density matrix Q Y . Notice that for p i = 1/2 we obtain
which is the value obtained earlier from the θ optimization. Clearly the lower bound depends on the fairness of the PRG in the sense that if |p i − 1/2| ≤ ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is an small positive real number, then |S(Q Y ) − S * | ≤ ǫ(i) as well (see Figure 6 ). Now consider k−length blocks X k , Y k and Z k , where X k = X i+1 , X i+2 , . . . , X i+k is a contiguous subsequence of {X i } and similarly to Y k and Z k . Notice that, to ease notation, we omit the index i in defining X k . However, it is crucial to remark that the probability distribution of X k is in general dependent on i. As a matter of fact p X k = p 0 , p 2 , . . . , p 2 k −1 can even degenerate to a distribution with a single component equal 1, depending on the robustness of the PRG. We shall simplify the notation denoting p X k by p.
First consider the classical set-up, then H(X k |Y k , Z k ) = 0, the block X k is completly determined from the knownledge of Y k and Z k . For quantum set up we establish a generalization of inequality (5) obtained earlier for single random variables, but now taking in consideration a quantum subsystem Q Y k = 2 k −1 j=0 p j |φ j φ j | where the states |φ j are choosen as the sequence of bases used to encode Y k , one set of these states for each instance of X k . The parameter θ is generalized as well, now determining Eve's optimum POVM minimizing the uncertainty on X k . We summarize these consideration as follows: Proposition 3.1 For the scheme shown in Figure 4 generalized to k−blocks as described above the following inequality holds
where
and p j , j ∈ {0, . . . , 2 k − 1} are the probabilities of the X k blocks. Table 1 illustrates the scenario for k = 2. Rows are indexed by the four possible values of Y 2 and columns are indexed by the bases corresponding to the four values of X 2 . Notice that Eve is not able to distinguish which column is being used. Then her uncertainty is lower bounded by the von Neumann entropy of the quantum system formed by the quantum states listed in row indexed by Y 2 she accesses. We conclude this section relating the condition on probability vectors p X k with the lower bound (6) .
We shall need two properties of the von Neumann entropy [4, pp.513-514] . 
In (7), Q Y k is a mixture of pure states weighted by the probabilities p j , j ∈ {0, . . . , 2 k − 1}. Accordingly, we write p j = Pr[X k = j b ] where j b is the binary representation of the integer j, (e.g., for k = 2, p 0 = Pr[X 2 = 00], p 1 = Pr[X 2 = 01], . . . ). As pure states |φ j φ j | are vertices of the convex hull of a convex state space [13] , the only way to Q Y k being pure is that there exist a j ∈ {0, . . . , 2 k − 1} such that p j = 1 and p j ′ = 0 for all j ′ = j.
On the other hand, as
where Q Y l stands for the l−th basis state, then a direct application of the second property application yields:
As a consequence of ( 8) for a fair Bernoulli sequence we have
Distances
Denote q the uniform distribution, that is q j = 1/2 k , j = 0, . . . , 2 k − 1. In this section we shall verify that if the probability distribution of a block X k from the PRG, say p, is near enough of distribution q for a block of size k then the lower bound of Proposition 3.1 will be kept significantly near of kS * , where S * ≈ 0.600 is the minimum uncertainty on X i (one qubit) Eve has to cope with. Let σ Y k be the density operator corresponding to a k−length block X k generated by a fair Bernoulli sequence given that the k-length block Y k is known, that is
In this section we establish some results relating von Neumann entropy with the trace distance
Recall that the trace distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is defined by
where |A| = √ A † A. We shall also need the trace distance between probability vectors, say a and b, defined by
The trace distance can be used to measure how biased a probability distribution is compared to a fair Bernoulli sampling. Given a probability distribution p, we call the bias of p the value B(p) = D(p, q) where q is the uniform distribution. 
where Q Y k is the state defined in Proposition 3.1.
Proof. Denote γ j = |φ j φ j |. From the strong convexity of the trace distance [4, p.407] we have:
and the result follows.
In the proof of the next proposition we shall apply Fannes' inequality [13, p.332]:
where it is assumed that D(ρ, σ) ≤ 1/(2e) and N is the dimension of the Hilbert space dimension where the states live in.
Theorem 3.5 If the conditions in Proposition 3.4 hold, that is if
Proof. Notice that function −xlnx is monotone in the interval (0, 1/e) therefore assuming 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/e then for N = 2 k , we have:
where (a) results from Fannes' inequality, (b) is due to logarithm properties and, (c) is due to Proposition 3.4.
This result indicates that if the PRG is such that the probability distribution of its output X k , say, p (possibly conditioned on the past), is near enough of the fair distribution q, then the Eve's uncertainty is kept near of maximum S (σ k ) = kS * (see Equations (8) and (9)). Notice that p is defined assuming that the secret seed of the PRG, X (n) , is chosen at random; consequently any more practical utilization of (15) will depend on the Eve's capability to estimate that distribution and clearly, on the kind of PRG is being used. For example, suppose we want upper bound the right side of (15) by a given tolerance defined by a positive real number δ. After some simple manipulation we obtain
Additionally, in the conditions of Proposition 3.4, that is, for bias B(p) < ǫ, we can rewrite (19) as
In detail, by means (20), Theorem 3.5 gives an idea that, by knowing a upper bound of the bias of a probability distribution, which is the largest block that will still ensure information security. But, an word of advice is necessary: recall that from its very definition, p depends on k and also depends on i because X k = X i+1 , X i+2 , . . . , X k . So the utilization of (20 ) must be carefully performed.
The following Corollary clarify the meaning of the Theorem 3.5 from an asymptotic point of view.
Corollary 2 Given a PRG, let p be the probability distribution of a k-length generated block, and let f (k, n) and g(n) positive functions such that:
In the next section we make a comparison between classical XOR and quantum QC Brassard's schemes for authentication of classical messages.
Analysis and Comparison of the Schemes
In this section we show that replacing XOR gate by the quantum encoder QC it is possible to attain increasing security utilizing just one short seed X (n) see (Figure 7 ). The idea is to compute the joint entropy of tags and random sequence conditioned on the knowledge of the message M and random variable Z in two distinct forms and manipulating them to obtain our claims. Along the comparisons it is assumed first that sequence {X i } is Bernoulli with parameter 1/2; when necessary we remark that it is not the case. In order to ease the notation, in this section, we denote by X k , as well Z k , k−binary digit block, as in previous section. We assume that X k , k = ⌈log |T |⌉ is independent of the message M and hash functions selected from the For the classical approach that is the XOR gate is employed (see Figure 1 ) and under assumption that {X i } is fair Bernoulli, the scheme is equivalent to the Wegman-Carter onetime pad scheme. In this case we have
Where equality (a) is due to chain rule for Shannon entropy, (b) is due to the fact that in the classical set-up X k = T ⊕ Z k , (c) is justifiable only if X k is a k−block of fair Bernoulli random variables, because in this case Z k will be also a k−bit block of fair Bernoulli random variables and independent of T . Equality (d) is due to the properties of hash functions. Then, if {X i } is a fair Bernoulli, for each message Eve situation is the same of the Wegman-Carter approach that requires selecting one hash function at random in H. On the other hand, if {X i } is not a fair Bernoulli, the Eve's uncertainty on the tag can eventually to decreased from the observation of random variable Z k . Now consider the quantum set-up. In order to simplify the notation and stress the dependence of θ on the message M and on the class H of hash functions, we writeZ k = Z k (θ(M, H)) in the following calculation.
Uncertainty of the tag and an information-theoretical guess
From the standard chain rule for Shannon entropy we have:
Then, comparing (25) and (26) we obtain
Where (a) is due to a simple manipulation of (25) and (26) , (b) is definition of mutual information and (c) is because if X is given perfect recovering of T is possible, so that situation H(T |X k , M,Z k ) = H(T |X k , M, T ) = 0. Equation (29) clearly indicates that in order to increase Eve's uncertainty about T we must maximize the mutual information between the key k−bit block X k and that tag T. This is the information-theoretical guess we follow to propose the scheme presented in Figure 7 .
One possibility to apply the earlier guess is to spend log |H| bits per message from {X i } to choose one hash function h X ∈ H and calculate T = h X (M ). But note that this implies utilizing log |H| > log |T | bits per message authentication. In this case, if {X i } is fair Bernoulli, Eve is facing a situation similar to that of one-time pad Wegman-Carter algorithm. It is clear that, if we are coping with real PRGs (no fair Bernoulli), then the conditions of Theorem 3.5 should be considered in order to evaluate the secure number of messages can be authenticated.
Another possibility to apply the guess is to spend log |T | per message from {X i } in order to hide the current tag. This approach is similar to thes Brassard's scheme with but with the hidden tag protected by the quantum encoding. Notice that as log |T | < log |H|, this scheme is less expensive in terms of key utilization. Notice that if {X i } is fair Bernoulli, Eve's situation is similar to that of one-time pad Wegman-Carter algorithm. Also in this approach if real PRGs are being used, then the conditions of Theorem 3.5 should be taken in consideration in order to evaluate the secure number of messages can be authenticated.
Uncertainty of the key
Now we examine the uncertainty H X k |M,Z k . We assume that messages M are statistically independent from key X yielding
Solving ( 25) and ( 26) for H X k |M,Z k we get
That is from ( 30) and ( 31) we have
We observe that throughout derivation lines above it is not necessary assume {X i } being fair Bernoulli except in some particular comments. Notice that all the schemes works as a Wegman-Carter algorithm if fair Bernoulli is assumed for {X i }. However, the main advantages of the proposed quantum short key scheme is that of increases the robustness of real PRGs as will be described in the next section.
